In the absence of such legislation, however, the Commission's charge is to make new law only when there is a sound, compelling case for doing so. Particularly where the proposed course of action is a significant increase in the length of prison sentences to be served by literally thousands of defendants, the burden of proving the advisability of acting is very high.
Thus far, the Justice Department's argument in favor of raising economic crime sentences across the board has rested entirely on the contention that the Commission was required to raise all sentences by the SarbanesOxley Act. Entirely absent has been any effort to explain why the Commission should enact a general sentence increase. To date, the Department has failed to support its proposals with arguments grounded in experience, statistical evidence, penological theory, reason, or common sense.
The Justice Department's approach has the rhetorical advantage of making a response difficult. One cannot rationally analyze an argument that has not been made. However, the Department's abstention from substantive argument leaves even a potentially sympathetic observer like myself-a former federal and state white collar prosecutor with no affinity for thieves and swindlers -at something of a loss. Therefore, in composing the following comments, I have been compelled to consider the arguments one can only presume the Department would make if it were to engage in a debate on the merits.
Response to a Crime Wave?
It occurred to me that the Department might be proposing sentence increases in response to a rising tide of economic crime. Therefore, I examined available statistics on the prevalence of economic offenses over the past several decades. I first considered the broad category of property crimes. Figures published by the Justice Department's Bureau of Justice Statistics show that the rate of property crime has been dropping steadily since 1974. As the BJS chart on the next page (Figure i) Of course, these national statistics are primarily for offenses prosecuted at the local level. Therefore, in order to determine if the national downward trend in property crime is mirrored in economic crimes prosecuted in federal court, I examined Justice Department statistics on referrals by federal investigative agencies to U.S. Attorney's Offices. As Figure 2 below illustrates, in recent years referrals to U.S. Attorney's Offices for economic offenses have declined steadily, dropping by 5, 166 As one would expect, maintaining a roughly constant number of economic crime defendants from a decreasing supply of economic crime referrals has meant U.S. Attorney's Offices must decline fewer economic crime cases. Figure 4 illustrates the decreasing declination rates for fraud and other property offenses between 1994 and 2000.
In sum, the available evidence suggests that, far from confronting a rising tide of economic crime, the Department of Justice has been obliged to dip ever deeper into a shrinking pool of offenders to hold roughly constant the flow of economic crime defendants through the federal courts. There are doubtless many explanations for this phenomenon. But whatever else these statistics may show, they do not make out a case for a general increase in economic crime penalties. 5 Moreover, the figures just cited apply only to those defendants actually sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Sentencing Commission figures also show that the percentage of economic crime defendants who received terms of imprisonment increased markedly throughout the 199os. Figure 5 below illustrates the upward movement in imprisonment rates for auto theft, larceny, fraud, embezzlement, forgery/counterfeiting, and tax offenders. Figures 5a, 5 b, and 5c break out the numbers for the major categories of fraud, larceny, embezzlement.
In short, during the 199os, an ever-increasing percentage of economic offenders were sentenced to prison and those who received prison sentences received higher average sentences.
Still more importantly for present purposes, the upward trend will accelerate over the next few years as the sentence increases built into the 2oos Economic Crime Package begin to take effect. With regard to the 2ooi amendments, three points should be noted. First, the 2ooi amendments are only the latest in a series of sentence increases for economic crime that have been enacted at intervals since the advent of the Guidelines in 1987. Second, these amendments embody very significant sentence increases for virtually all economic crime defendants whose offenses are even moderately serious. And third, because the 2ooi amendments affect only defendants whose crimes occurred after November i, 2ooi, relatively few defendants have been sentenced under the new law and we have no meaningful data on its effects.
In order to illustrate the first two of these points, I have assembled an illustrative group of hypothetical defendants with varying loss amounts and offense characteristics. Figures 6a and 6b below describe these defendants and the sentences they would probably have been subject to in 1987, 1989, i99i, 1998, November 2ooi, and presently.
Figures 6a and 6b illustrate visually several points of central importance:
First, Guideline sentences for economic crime have been raised repeatedly since 1987. For some classes of offenders, the Commission has raised sentences four times since 1987, and three times within the last five years.
Second, the increases are very substantial, in both absolute and percentage terms. The Guideline sentence of all but one defendant in Figure 6b whose loss level exceeds $io,ooo has at least doubled since 1987 (and that defendant [E] would now receive a sentence 6o% higher than in 1987). For the five most serious offenders, sentences rose between i6o% and 33o%. In absolute terms, Guideline sentences for the same conduct rose by as little as four months (Defendant B) to as much as fourteen additional years (Defendant I). And in the case of Defendant J, whose circumstances rirror those of the leading figures in last summer's corporate scandals, the minimum guideline sentence has skyrocketed from less than five years in 1987 to mandatory life imprisonment.
Third, the sentence increases shown in Figure 6b 
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corporate fraud-the Commission has added a plethora of sentence enhancements. Fourth, Figure 6b does not capture an important component of the 2ooi Economic Crime Package that will produce additional sentence increases beyond those immediately obvious from reading the Loss Table or Specific Offense Characteristics. The revised definition of loss, which focuses on pecuniary harms reasonably foreseeable to a defendant at the time of the offense will, in a good many cases, produce a higher loss figure and thus a higher sentence than the old definition. 7 Fifth, it bears repeating that the impact of the 2001 sentence increases has not yet been felt because these increases are applicable only to offenses completed on or after November i, 2OOI.
Too low as compared to the states?
It occurred to me that perhaps the Department's argument is based on a comparison to sentences under state law, so I examined national statistics on economic crime sentences. Figure 7 compares state and federal economic crime sentences for 1998 using Justice Department figures for the most recent year for which BJS has published data. Precise state-federal comparisons are difficult given differences in offense definitions, sentencing practices, categorization of offense characteristics, the availability in states of parole, etc. Nonetheless, it appears that, on average, sentences served by federal economic offenders are markedly more severe than those served by state economic crime defendants. And the 1998 figures I have cited here do not account for the federal sentence increases in November 1998, 2ooi, and 2003. Therefore, the Justice Department's position cannot be explained as an effort to achieve parity with state sentences.
Too low as compared to other federal crimes?
Perhaps the Justice Department is of the view that economic crime sentences are too low in comparison with sentences for other types of federal crime. A superficially plausible case for this view might be made by comparing the 2oo1 average white-collar sentence of just over 20 months with the average drug sentence (71.7 mos.) or violent crime sentence (89.5 mos.) 5 However, any such comparison of averages would be inherently flawed. First, no serious observer would argue that crimes against property are as serious as violent crimes against persons. Second, it would be surprising, to say the least, if this Administration were to contend that garden variety thefts and frauds are as serious as drug trafficking, an activity the Administration has publicly linked to terrorism and cited as a threat to national security.
In any event, focusing on the relatively low average prison sentence for the entire class of white collar offenders is profoundly misleading because the vast majority of federal economic crime defendants are low- Figure 8) . In short, the average federal economic crime sentence is relatively low, not because the sentencing structure is unduly lenient, but because U.S. Attorney's Offices are prosecuting thousands of small cases in which little or no prison time would be called for under any rational sentencing scheme. If, rather than focusing on the average sentence, one looks instead at the sentences now required for even moderately serious white collar offenders -the defendants who were the real concern of Congress in enacting Sarbanes-Oxley -the comparative picture is very different. For example, the current sentencing range of Defendant C in Figure 6b above (the postal worker who committed a $35,000 credit card fraud) is 27-33 months; the low end of this range is eight months longer than the average bribery sentence in 2ooi and three months longer than the average sentence for burglary.-° Defendant E (the doctor who overbilled Medicare for $125,ooo) has a sentencing range of 33-41 months; the low end of this range is nine months longer than the average sentence imposed on burglars in 2ooi and almost exactly equivalent to the 34.3 month average sentence for manslaughter. The range for Defendant F (the telemarketer who bilked elderly victims of $250,000) is 97-121 months, or 8-io years. This is eight months longer than the average sentence imposed for violent crimes in 2oo1, and 25 months longer than the average drug sentence. 
